

SECRET

25X1

MLO

9 June 1965

OCI No. 0567/65
Copy No.

7



INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

This publication provides a periodic review of internal security in underdeveloped countries where there is a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence

25X1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

W A R N I N G

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

This publication provides a periodic review of internal security in underdeveloped countries where there is a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Laos	1
Congo	/1
Sudan	2
Ethiopian Internal Situation. . . .	3
Argentina	5
Bolivia	6
<div data-bbox="370 1266 1234 1398" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 60px; width: 100%;"></div>	
Colombia	8
Guatemala	8
Venezuela	9

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

OCI No. 0567/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
9 June 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Review of Insurgency Problems1. Laos

Communist military pressure continues against government positions in northwestern Laos and in Samneua and Xieng Khouang provinces along Route 6. There are no indications of a major Communist offensive, however. Government air strikes, although hampered by rains, will probably continue to serve as an important deterrent to large-scale Communist activity. In the panhandle, government forces continue to press Communist elements in the Dong Hene - Muong Pha Lane area in an effort to forestall a possible enemy thrust.

Between 20 and 25 May Communist patrols drove three roadwatch teams from positions on Routes 23 and 12. This development will significantly curtail surveillance of these key infiltration routes in the panhandle. Heavy rains, however, have now severely affected the trafficability of these roads, and no further major truck movements are likely during the rainy season.

2. Congo

Government troops are continuing their virtually unopposed mop-up operations around Buta in the northeastern Congo. Following the capture of Buta on 1 June, a column pursued the rebels toward Banalia, 180 miles north of Stanleyville. These forces linked up there with another column from Stanleyville, but no hostages were found. Small detachments operating out of Buta continue

SECRET

SECRET


to seek the remaining 70-odd hostages--mostly women and children--taken into the bush by the fleeing rebels.

Clearing operations in other areas are also progressing well. Government units from Stanleyville are advancing down both banks of the Congo River. In the south, they continue to advance against faltering rebel resistance west of Fizi.

3. Sudan

The new Umma-dominated assembly will convene in Khartoum on 10 June. No Communists were elected from the geographical constituencies, although they probably captured a few of the 15 seats at stake in the special University graduates elections, the results of which have not yet been announced.

The Umma has charged several former army officers and two leftist members of the transitional cabinet with complicity in an "Egyptian-backed" plot against the government. The plotters, primarily members of the leftist People's Democratic Party (PDP), were supposedly planning to use Syrian arms which had been sent to Khartoum for the Eritrean Liberation Movement to back their take-over bid. Several arrests have been made, and the Umma seems to be well in command of the situation. In fact, while some PDP agitators may have hoped to use the arms, the Umma has probably publicized the presence of the arms in Khartoum at this time as an excuse to arrest potential troublemakers before convening the new parliament. There is no firm evidence of the existence of any well-organized plot.

The security situation in the southern provinces continues to deteriorate. No elections were held in the south, and southern spokesmen now are denying the legality of the new parliament. A second north-south conference is scheduled to be held by the end of June, but no accommodation is yet in sight.


SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Ethiopian Internal Situation

4. Pressure for basic internal reforms has been increasing. Emperor Haile Selassie's reluctance to initiate substantial changes is generating increased criticism as it becomes apparent to his subjects. Subversive efforts of Communist countries and the Moslem states appear to have made some headway during the past six months by playing upon dissatisfaction within the government, among students, and to some extent in military circles. There still is no organized, cohesive opposition to the Emperor, however, and the vast majority of Ethiopians believe that the throne is indispensable for the unity of the empire.

Many of the government officials and other educated elite desire to limit the Emperor's authoritarian powers and to obtain for themselves a more meaningful role in Ethiopian politics. There have been recent reports that several Ethiopian ambassadors are considering resigning in order to bring concerted pressure on the Emperor to institute reforms. There have also been recent requests from moderate government officials for US intervention to persuade him to take such steps. These groups, however, do not at present appear to desire the Emperor's removal.

Early last month a student protest against the expulsion of nine student leaders from University College, Addis Ababa, turned into a series of peaceful demonstrations which had strong anti-US overtones. The heavy-handed tactics used by the police in suppressing the demonstrations served to unite the student body and to arouse public criticism. This was only the most recent example of student unrest. The students' low morale is attributed to poor living and study facilities, the banning of student organizations, and unsatisfied pressures for progress and reform in Ethiopia. A small but well-organized radical student group persists

SECRET


25X1

SECRET

in exploiting the unrest, and outside agitation
may be a factor.


25X1

25X1



Many military officers resent the Emperor's indecisiveness. They are also bitter about the antiquated command structure, the lack of logistical support, and the large number of incompetent senior officers. The Emperor appears unwilling to remove these irritants, probably fearing that an efficient modern army might challenge his authority. The army's resultant inability to cope effectively with insurgency in the outlying provinces has been a constant source of frustration for many officers. However, any march on Addis Ababa by the widely dispersed army would probably be resisted by the 1st Division--the capital garrison--which the Emperor appears to have reconstituted into an Imperial Bodyguard under his own personal command.

Many officers, particularly those in the Ogaden region in the east, have a particular grievance in the Emperor's refusal to authorize reprisals against the Somali Army for its support of insurgency there. Internal security problems such as the guerrilla activities of the Somali tribes in the Ogaden and the Muslim-led insurgency in Eritrea do not presently threaten the stability of the Emperor's regime. In recent months there has been a lull in the Somali insurgency, but Ethiopian officials continue to voice their fear of the Somali Republic's intentions and growing military strength. Although these fears may be exaggerated, Somali agents have provided modern weapons to the Muslim Galla tribes in Bale Province, which recently clashed with Ethiopian troops. The Somali Government has also given limited support to the Eritrean dissidents, whose leaders are trying

**SECRET**

SECRET

[redacted]

to organize an Eritrean Liberation Front in Khartoum. Although the dissidents have received some support from Syria and Egypt as well as Somalia, they are not yet strong enough to threaten the unity of Ethiopia. However, if any one of these dissident groups succeeds in resisting government forces, other ethnic minorities in remote provinces might be encouraged to revolt against the predominantly Christian-Amharic government. This would seriously tax the hard-pressed security forces.

There are indications that the Emperor may attempt to deflect pressures for domestic reforms by adopting a less Western-oriented foreign policy. He also appears deliberately to be trying to divert the dissatisfaction of the elite from himself to alleged failures of the US aid program-- Ethiopia's primary source of outside support. Many well-placed Ethiopians are said to believe that closer relations with Communist countries would benefit Ethiopia materially, without loss of Western aid. The Emperor himself probably feels that a more nonaligned posture would increase Ethiopia's influence in Africa. Recently for a period of several weeks Ethiopian officials indicated that their government would recognize Communist China before the Afro-Asian conference begins on 29 June.

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

5. Argentina

US Consul Temple Wanamaker was wounded by a burst of machine-gun fire on the afternoon of 7 June in Cordoba--about 500 miles northwest of Buenos Aires. There is as yet no indication who the attackers were or why Wanamaker was the target.

This is the second attack on Wanamaker within the past 30 days. On 12 May, his car was damaged by an incendiary bomb [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

-5-

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1




25X1

There have been other recent reports that terrorist activities were planned by various extremist groups in the event Argentine troops were sent to the Dominican Republic, and consequent attacks on US personnel and property were threatened by the Peronist Revolutionary Movement and the ultra-nationalist National Restoration Guard. Between 24 May and 2 June bombs were reportedly exploded at seven US-connected companies.

6. Bolivia

There is still no clear indication when the armed forces will move into those mining centers still outside government control, but the advanced state of preparations points to occupation within the next few days. The junta is apparently delaying the move in order to give military interveners time to gain acceptance of the 23 May decree for mine rehabilitation without a fight, to collect arms held by the miners, and to transport leftist leaders seeking asylum out of the mine areas. Although the government is having some success at this, military occupation will be necessary, and the longer the junta delays the stronger the resistance will be. There are reports that those extremist leaders still remaining in the mines, emboldened by the government's delay, are beginning to regain their control.

**SECRET**

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001100040004-8

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001100040004-8

SECRET

25X1

9. Colombia

Violence may erupt during the traditional commemoration on 9 June by university and secondary school students of the deaths of student "martyrs" who were killed while rioting against the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla on that date in 1954. The students usually demonstrate vigorously but harmlessly. However, the increased tensions this year between students and government security forces--and the army's freedom under the state of siege to react with greater force than in less troubled years--could convert vigor into violence.

Another potential cause of violence is the general unrest and discontent spawned by the government's vacillation over economic issues, such as devaluation of the currency. Extremists of both right and left may, if circumstances permit, incite the great numbers of discontented but politically unawakened slum dwellers, most of whom are already feeling the squeeze of inflation.

10. Guatemala


A Communist Party assassination list,

names

most of the high-ranking military officials of the government, including Chief of Government Peralta and the deputy minister of defense who was murdered on 21 May. The publicizing of such lists by the Communists, together with the actual occurrence of occasional assassinations, has been successful in provoking fear and anxiety among officials.

On the night of 7 June, about five bombs went off in Guatemala City. Targets included the Brazilian Embassy residence, the Nicaraguan Embassy, and facilities of the International Railways of Central America.

-8-

**SECRET**

25X1

SECRET




11. Venezuela

On 4 June an explosive device damaged a US-owned pipeline near Barcelona in eastern Venezuela. Heavy mobilization of troops in the face of increased guerrilla activity was reported by the press on 6 June. The move follows several skirmishes in recent days in Miranda State, which resulted in about 10 guerrilla casualties, one soldier killed, and another wounded. On 23 May, guerrillas murdered and mutilated two peasants and kidnapped a third in Cupira, Miranda, the area in which the government build-up is apparently taking place.



SECRET

25X1




25X11

SECRET



25X1



25X1

SECRET